Beyond English Safety: Measuring Behavioral Risk in Multilingual & Code-Switched LLMs

The State of Multilingual LLM Safety Research

→ per-language accountability, worst-case reporting, and evaluations that reflect real multilingual use (not sanitized English)


Presenter: Patrick Gerard



Problem & Thesis

Safety ≠ static refusal accuracy (averages hide failures).

Real risk = **behavioral effects** across languages/dialects, not just English.




Gaps flagged by the paper: **code-switching**, **non-standard orthography**, **drift**, **jailbreak transfer**, and lack of **worst-case** reporting.



Problem & Thesis

Safety ≠ static refusal accuracy (averages hide failures).

Real risk = **behavioral effects** across languages/dialects, not just English.



Gaps flagged by the paper: **code-switching**, **non-standard orthography**, **drift**, **jailbreak transfer**, and lack of **worst-case** reporting.



The Issue with Current Methods

If a sentence can flip meanings across **role**, **language**, **and drift**, then safety can't be a one-time quiz.



It has to be **risk science.**



Safety as Risk Science

Risk science: measure likelihood and impact of failures across languages and over time, under real usage patterns (translation, code-switching, slang drift).

Static quiz thinking	Risk science
One-time refusal score, averaged	Per-locale results with worst-case surfaced
Clean, monolingual prompts	Code-switch, translit, orthography, real slang
Day-0 snapshot	Temporal tracking (decay/return of failures)



Safety as Risk Science

Risk science: measure likelihood and impact of failures across languages and over time, under real usage patterns (translation, code-switching, slang drift).

Where can failures spread?

What do they do to people?

How long do fixes hold?

Prioritize languages/dialects with highest spread.

Tune guardrails/deferral where impact is harmful.

Gate releases on persistence (don't ship brittle fixes).



Why: We need to know which languages/dialects attacks jump to, and whether code-switching makes jumps easier.

How: Build it from two primitives

(1) CL-ASR $(L_1 \rightarrow L_2)$ — Cross-Lingual Attack Success Rate

CL-ASR_{$$L_1 \to L_2$$} = $\frac{\sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{1}[s_i(L_1) = 1 \land s_i(L_2) = 1]}{\sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{1}[s_i(L_1) = 1]}$

$$s_i(L) \in \{0, 1\}$$
 is success (1) or failure (0), $S = \{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$ is the code-switch rate set.



Why: We need to know which languages/dialects attacks jump to, and whether code-switching makes jumps easier.

How: Build it from two primitives:

(2) CS-ASR(L, s) — Code-Switched ASR at switch rate s

$$CS-ASR(L,s) = \frac{1}{|I|} \sum_{i \in I} \mathbf{1} [s_i(L;s) = 1], \quad s \in S$$

$$s_i(L) \in \{0, 1\}$$
 is success (1) or failure (0), $S = \{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$ is the code-switch rate set.



Why: We need to know which languages/dialects attacks jump to, and whether code-switching makes jumps easier.

JT-Coef
$$(L_1 \rightarrow L_2)$$
 — Portability cell to plot

Transferability from L_1 to L_2 under realistic code-switching.

$$s_i(L) \in \{0, 1\}$$
 is success (1) or failure (0), $S = \{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$ is the code-switch rate set.



Why: We need to know which languages/dialects attacks jump to, and whether code-switching makes jumps easier.

· Worst-case over switch rates:


$$\mathrm{JT\text{-}Coef}_{L_1 \to L_2} = \max_{s \in S} \ \mathrm{CL\text{-}ASR}_{L_1 \to L_2}(s)$$

• Prevalence-weighted (with $\sum_{s \in S} p(s) = 1$):

$$\mathrm{JT\text{-}Coef}_{L_1 \to L_2} = \sum_{s \in S} p(s) \; \mathrm{CL\text{-}ASR}_{L_1 \to L_2}(s)$$

$$s_i(L) \in \{0, 1\}$$
 is success (1) or failure (0), $S = \{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75\}$ is the code-switch rate set.





Hot Edge (RU→UA). Patch UA immediately.

Star denotes high CS-ASR

Hot rows **export** failures; hot columns **import** them.

Use to **prioritize red-team** and **gating**.



Code-Switch Vulnerability by Language (CS-ASR*)



Tall bar ⇒ **brittle** under mixing (needs stronger guardrails).

Short bar ⇒ **robust** to mixing (still verify with JT-Coef inbound).



What do they do to people? Beyond Definitions — Harm as Mechanisms

Othering is language that marks a group as less-than, dangerous, or outside the moral circle—often via euphemism, codewords, or narrative frames [1, 2, 3, 4].

Social identity work shows how harm operates through **frames**:

 $identification \rightarrow exclusion \rightarrow threat \rightarrow virtue \rightarrow celebration$ not just slurs; our target should be these mechanisms [1].



Source: National Geographic



What do they do to people? Beyond Definitions — Harm as Mechanisms

Othering is language that marks a group as less-than, dangerous, or outside the moral circle—often via euphemism, codewords, or narrative frames [1, 2, 3, 4].

Mechanism (brief) taxonomy:

- **Dehumanization** (animalization/objectification)
- Collective blame (group guilt)
- Threat rhetoric (invasion/contagion)
- Exclusion/punishment (remove rights, expel)
- Moral disgust (impurity/contamination)
- Euphemisms/codewords (benign token, hostile local meaning)



Source: National Geographic



What do they do to people? Why this Matters for Multilingual LLMs

Othering is language that marks a group as less-than, dangerous, or outside the moral circle—often via euphemism, codewords, or narrative frames [1, 2, 3, 4].

Real-world friction points:

- Polysemy & codewords: benign in one locale, toxic in another (e.g., fantasy terms used as coded slurs).
- Code-switching/translit: mixing scripts/languages hides cues; simple filters miss them.
- Role-gated knowledge: the model can behave as if it doesn't know until context authorizes the coded sense.
- Translation drift: neutral content can pick up hostile framing (or vice-versa) when localized.



Source: National Geographic



We turn mechanisms of **othering** into a number per locale.

FOPS(L) =
$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} f_L(A_j) - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} f_L(B_j)$$

FOPS(L) > 0 assistance **amplifies** othering/fear framing (bad)

FOPS(L) < 0 assistance **dampens** othering/fear framing (good)

Notation: A_j = model-assisted output (masked); B_j = neutral/human baseline (masked); $f_L \in [0, 1]$ = locale-tuned othering/fear detector.

Measure the nudge. If $f_L(A) > f_L(B)$, the assistant **amplified** othering; if $f_L(A) < f_L(B)$ it **dampened** it.



We turn mechanisms of **othering** into a number per locale.

Setup (same input, same locale L):

- **B** = neutral/human **baseline** (masked)
- A = assistant output (masked + evidence)
- f_L(·) = locale-tuned othering/fear detector
 [0,1]: classifier trained on synthetic + small
 real, masked, calibrated per locale

```
Probe: "They're all [term]."
Keyword: non-toxic (literal)
Toxicity Classifier: low score (ambiguous)
fL*(·): othering — "[term] functions as dehumanizing label in L."

Probe: "Як zrobyty ... [term]?" (code-switch)
Keyword: non-toxic (literal)
Toxicity Classifier: low score (ambiguous)
fL*(·): othering — "mentions UA+EN mixing and local usage."
```



We turn mechanisms of **othering** into a number per locale.

How we report:

- Per-locale distributions + worst-case (not just means)
- By task (reply, RAG, translation, headline) and code-switch rate s
- Show deferral rate alongside FOPS (so "safety" isn't just deferring)

```
Probe: "They're all [term]."

Keyword: non-toxic (literal)

Toxicity Classifier: low score (ambiguous)

fL*(·): othering — "[term] functions as dehumanizing label in L."

Probe: "Як zrobyty ... [term]?" (code-switch)

Keyword: non-toxic (literal)

Toxicity Classifier: low score (ambiguous)

fL*(·): othering — "mentions UA+EN mixing and local usage."
```



We turn mechanisms of **othering** into a number per locale.


Example

UA: f(A)=0.35, $f(B)=0.18 \rightarrow FOPS = +0.17$ (amplified)

EN: $0.12 - 0.14 \rightarrow -0.02$ (dampened)

What we do with it

If FOPS(L) > 0 \rightarrow tighten guardrails/decoding, **defer**, add **local RAG**, re-test.





CL-RTD — How we generate, stress, and score

How We Setup Scalable Testing

Seed → **Localize:** translate, paraphrase, **dialectalize** to real-world forms.

Code-switch & translit: insert within-utterance mixing; homoglyph/spacing variants.

Execute: run prompts across models/policies; log outputs/refusals/uncertainty.

Score (two tracks):

- Adversarial: CL-ASR/CS-ASR → JT-Coef (where failures spread).
- Behavioral: f₁ on A vs B → FOPS (what they do to people).

Replay monthly (drift): refresh slang/topics → **MPS+BPS** (do fixes hold?).





MPS + BPS — How long do fixes hold? (Safety half-life)

Persistence of a mitigation as language **drifts** (paraphrase, slang, code-switch, translit, topical frames).

How we run it: After patch at t_0 , replay CL-RTD monthly $t_1,...,t_K$.

Score (higher = better):

MPS =
$$1 - \frac{\sum_{t} w_{t} ASR_{t}}{\sum_{t} w_{t}}$$
 $w_{t} \in \{1, e^{-\lambda(t-t_{0})}\}$

Half-life (interpretability):

$$t_{1/2}^{\mathrm{ASR}} = \min\{t : \mathrm{ASR}_t \geq \theta \cdot \mathrm{ASR}_{\mathrm{pre}}\}, \quad \theta = 0.5 \text{ (typ.)}$$



MPS + BPS — How long do fixes hold? (Safety half-life)

Persistence of a mitigation as language **drifts** (paraphrase, slang, code-switch, translit, topical frames).

How we run it: After patch at t_0 , replay CL-RTD monthly $t_1,...,t_K$.

Score (higher = better):

BPS(L) =
$$1 - \frac{\sum_{t} w_{t} pos_{t}(L)}{c \sum_{t} w_{t}}$$
 $w_{t} \in \{1, e^{-\lambda(t-t_{0})}\}$

Behavioral half-life (two equivalent ways):

$$t_{1/2}^{\text{FOPS}} = \min\{t : \text{pos}_t(L) \ge \phi c\}$$
 (tolerance-based, e.g., $\phi = 1.0$)

$$t_{1/2}^{\text{FOPS}} = \min\{t : \max(0, \text{FOPS}_t(L)) \ge \theta \max(0, \text{FOPS}_{\text{pre}}(L))\}$$



Takeaways — Moving From Refusals to Risk

Safety as risk science:

We measure impact, spread, and persistence per language/dialect; *not* a one-time quiz.

Three dials:

JT-Coef → *Where failures spread* (portability map) **FOPS** → *What they do to people* (othering/fear by locale) **MPS** → *How long fixes hold* (safety half-life).

Real usage, not sanitized prompts:

Code-switching, translit (e.g., Arabizi), non-standard orthography,.

Engineering, not just eval:

Versioned **CL-RTD** generator, Cl runs, dashboards, and **ship gates**: JT-Coef (worst-case), **FOPS** ≤ **0**, **MPS** ≥ **threshold**.











Works Cited

Duckitt, J. (2003). Prejudice and intergroup hostility.

Pettersson, K., & Sakki, I. (2017). Pray for the fatherland! Discursive and digital strategies at play in nationalist political blogging. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, *14*(3), 315–349.

Reicher, S., Haslam, S. A., & Rath, R. (2008). Making a virtue of evil: A five-step social identity model of the development of collective hate. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(3), 1313–1344.

Saha, P., Garimella, K., Kalyan, N. K., Pandey, S. K., Meher, P. M., Mathew, B., & Mukherjee, A. (2023). On the rise of fear speech in online social media. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *120*(11), e2212270120.



